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Abstract 
In texts such as “Richard Rorty’s Pragmatic Turn” Jürgen Habermas defends a theory 
that associates, on the one hand, the truth-claim raised by a speaker for a proposition 
p with, on the other hand, the requirement that p be “defendable on the basis of 
good reasons […] at any time and against anybody”. This, as is known, has been the 
target of criticisms by Rorty, who−in spite of agreeing with Habermas on the central 
tenet that the way of evaluating our beliefs must be argumentative practice−declares 
that the only “ideal presupposed by discourse” is “that of being able to justify your 
beliefs to a competent audience”. We will consider two texts from 1971 –surprisingly 
neglected in most approaches to the debate– in which Habermas did include such 
a “competence condition” to elucidate the notion of truth. We will discuss whether 
there are good reasons to relinquish such a condition and to refer, instead, only to 
the formal or procedural properties of argumentative exchanges, as Habermas does 
in presenting the notion of “ideal speech situation”. As we will try to argue, there are 
no such good reasons.
Key words: Richard Rorty; Jürgen Habermas; Universalism; Ethnocentrism.
Resumen
En textos como “El giro pragmático de Richard Rorty”, Jürgen Habermas defiende 
una teoría que asocia, por un lado, la pretensión de verdad planteada por un hablante 
para una proposición p con, por otro lado, el requisito de que p sea “defendible sobre la 
base de buenas razones […] en cualquier momento y frente a cualquiera”. Esto, como 
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se sabe, ha sido el blanco de críticas de Rorty, quien (pese a compartir con Habermas la 
tesis central de que la práctica argumentativa ha de ser la forma de evaluar nuestras 
creencias) declara que el único “ideal presupuesto por el discurso” es “el de poder 
justificar las propias creencias frente a un público competente”. Consideraremos dos 
textos de 1971 –sorprendentemente omitidos en la mayor parte de los acercamientos 
al debate– en los cuales Habermas de hecho incluyó, para analizar la noción de 
verdad, una “condición de competencia” como la mencionada, y discutiremos si existen 
buenas razones para abandonar una condición tal y referirse, en su lugar, únicamente 
a las propiedades formales o procedimentales de los intercambios argumentativos, 
como lo hace Habermas al presentar la noción de “situación ideal de habla”. Como 
intentaremos argumentar, no hay tales buenas razones. 
Palabras clave: Richard Rorty; Jürgen Habermas; Universalismo; Etnocentrismo.
1. Introduction and outline
“I agree with Apel and Habermas”, Richard Rorty has written, 
“that Peirce was right in telling us to talk about discourse rather than 
about consciousness, but I think that the only ideal presupposed by 
discourse is that of being able to justify your beliefs to a competent 
audience”. And, he adds, “everything depends upon what constitutes 
a competent audience” (Rorty, 2000, p. 9. Emphasis in the original). 
In contrast to this “ideal”, Rorty is criticizing what he takes to be the 
Habermasian tenet that the ideal presupposed by discourse is that 
of being able to justify one’s beliefs to anyone–an elucidation that 
includes no “competence condition”. Now, quite surprisingly, there are 
two texts, not mentioned by Rorty, where Habermas does include such 
a competence clause: Habermas’ Gauss Lectures of 1971, and parallel 
passages in his Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie?, of the 
same year (Habermas, 2002; Habermas & Luhmann, 1971/1979).
We will try to prove two points. As a purely historical matter, 
we will show, contra Rorty, that Habermas did, once, make room for 
a competence condition in his theory. Therefore, the right question to 
tackle when considering the differences between Habermas and Rorty 
should not be “why does Habermas not include a competence condition 
like the one Rorty demands?” but, in any case, “why did Habermas 
relinquish such a notion, that had been included in earlier versions of 
his theory?”. We will try to show that ignoring the early Habermasian 
references to the problem of competence obscures what his differences 
with Rorty consist of. As a strictly philosophical, not only historical, point, 
we will try to show that Habermas’ abandonment of the competence 
condition is not well justified. In other words, that his own references 
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to the role of the notion of “competent subject” for the elucidation of 
“truth” or “justification” do not provide us with good grounds to move, 
as Habermas does in later texts, to an “unqualified” universalism that 
appeals to the notion of “rational consensus” without specifying that 
consensuses with a probative value must be those among competent 
interlocutors. 
We will proceed as follows: in section 2.1, we will briefly revise 
Rorty’s counterexamples to Habermas’ universalism–his criticism that 
such a theory entails a demand to justify one’s beliefs before Attila, 
a Nazi or a three-year-old. In section 2.2, in order not to take Rorty’s 
examples at face value, we will assess them by exploring, first, the 
scope of Habermas’ proposal (namely, if it in fact refers to discussing 
our views against literally everyone) and, second, the character of such 
proposal (namely, if it is some kind of epistemic deontology). We will 
need to distinguish between our obligations as “spreaders of the word” 
and as “truth-seekers”, insofar as it is only the second possibility that 
can be supported by Habermas’ claims about entering in symmetrical 
argumentative exchanges (which do not imply that we have any 
obligation to teach children, or Nazis). To show more clearly what kind 
of proposal Habermas’ is, in section 2.3 we will introduce the German 
author’s ipsissima uerba in some texts from the early 1970s, in which 
he presents an attempt to define truth in terms of universal agreement 
under certain circumstances. With this attempted definition in mind, we 
will return, in section 2.4, to Rorty’s counterexamples in order to assess 
whether this early Habermasian proposal actually makes it reasonable 
to demand us to defend our beliefs against every possible interlocutor. 
We will consider Wellmer’s remarks that the rational obligation not to 
“protect” our beliefs against the possibility of refutation does not entail a 
rational obligation to enter into every possible argumentative exchange. 
There can be certain propositions which we can reasonably discard 
as simply not worth discussing – and also, which is precisely Rorty’s 
point, certain subjects that we may discard, as a general rule, as simply 
incapable of offering good objections against our beliefs. 
Now, given that Habermas’ early attempt to provide an epistemic 
definition of truth is an element that is later abandoned, we will need 
to consider, in section 2.5, the turn Habermas takes in 1996, when he 
turns, instead, to an elucidation of the problem of what it is to “convince 
ourselves” of the truth of a proposition – that is, the turn from a theory 
of truth to a theory of justification. We will point out, in section 2.6, 
that the key difficulty pointed out by Rorty affects this new version 
of the theory as well: even if the notion of rational consensus is not 
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used to define “truth” but to elucidate “justification”, the problem is 
still to determine why such consensus should not be restricted only to 
competent interlocutors.
Now, as we anticipated, our strictly historical point is that 
Habermas did once consider the competence condition–and later 
relinquished it; to prove this, we will tackle more deeply, in section 3, 
Habermas’ two texts from 1971. Habermas’ 1971 proposal, however, 
does not strictly coincide with what Rorty will demand. According to 
Habermas, whereas the notion of “truth” is indeed dependent on that 
of rational agreement between competent subjects, the condition 
of “competent subject” can itself only be attributed on the basis of a 
rational consensus–and therefore is not susceptible to being used as 
an “independent” notion, conceptually prior to the problem of rational 
agreement. In Habermas’ view, then, a circle emerges between, on the one 
hand, the problem of determining whether certain de facto agreement is 
indeed relevant for the establishment of the truth of a proposition, and, 
on the other hand, the problem of determining whether or not certain 
subjects are in fact competent. 
This is, as we will see in section 4, a circle that Habermas wishes 
to overcome by means of the notion of “ideal speech situation”. However, 
as we will try to show, the introduction of this notion does not replace 
the need for a competence condition. Rather, we will argue – on the basis 
of a discussion in Habermas’ “Wahrheitstheorien”, originally published 
in 1973 − that the kind of procedural aspects that characterize an ideal 
speech situation cannot work a creatio ex nihilo of good arguments.
Finally, in section 5, we will try to show, via a detour through 
an exchange of criticisms between Rorty and Albrecht Wellmer, that 
the introduction of the notion of “competent subject” raises the obvious 
problem of non-neutrality between communities holding different 
beliefs: the status of “competent subject” will not be attributed in 
one of such communities to the same individuals as in the other. 
“Competent” will then mean “competent for us”. Nevertheless, we 
will hold that this should not raise a special difficulty for Habermas, 
insofar as his own epistemology of the social sciences is distinguished 
by the acknowledgment that practitioners of such sciences can be 
methodologically compelled to impose their own standards of rationality, 
if necessary, against those of the subjects they are trying to understand. 
Habermas’ theory, from this point of view, already needs to make room 
for a non-neutral appeal to the standards of one’s culture.
217
ANÁLISIS FILOSÓFICO 40 Nº 2 (noviembre 2020)
HABERMAS, RORTY, AND THE PROBLEM OF COMPETENT INTERLOCUTORS
2. Rorty’s objection and some preliminary clarifications
2.1. Attila, the Nazi, the three-year-old, and traditional Chinese 
physicians: Rorty’s criticism of Habermas’ universalism
As is known, the universalism that Rorty finds -and criticizes- in 
Habermas consists in the idea that, in order to analyze the truth claims 
that we raise, we need to appeal to some notion of “universal community of 
justification”. In “Universality and truth”, the American neo-pragmatist 
questions such a universalistic proposal by presenting a series of obvious 
counter-examples, such as the implausibility of trying to defend a belief 
about justice to Attila, or about trigonometry to three-year-olds (Rorty, 
2000, p. 11), and assumes that universalistic philosophers might actually 
mean, not that they are in fact engaged in such desperate attempts, but 
that they want to educate their interlocutors (not only children but also, 
for example, Nazis) so that they become able to accept more reasonable 
beliefs (Rorty, 2000, p. 19). In any case, according to Rorty, universalist 
philosophers should become more aware that human beings are split 
into different communities of justification on the basis of a sufficient 
overlapping between their respective beliefs and desires (Rorty, 2000, 
p. 15). “None of us”, writes Rorty, “take all audiences seriously; we all 
reject requests for justification from some audiences as a waste of time. 
(Consider the surgeon refusing to justify her procedure to Christian 
Scientists, or to Chinese physicians who suggest relying on acupuncture 
and moxibustion)” (Rorty, 2000, p. 27). In this way, Rorty is rephrasing his 
previous claim that “everybody is ethnocentric when engaged in actual 
debate”, because to be one is simply “to divide the human race into the 
people to whom one must justify one’s beliefs and the others. The first 
group–one’s ethnos–comprises those who share enough of one’s beliefs to 
make fruitful conversation possible” (Rorty, 1984b, p. 12).
 
2.2. Are Rorty’s counterexamples good?
There are two points that seem to be distinguishable in Habermas’ 
universalism and which raise Rorty’s doubts. The first point refers to 
the scope of the community of justification which Habermas might be 
theorizing about (are we literally speaking about every language user?); 
the second, to the specific kind of proposal that Habermas seems to 
present in his discourse theory (is it an epistemic deontology?).
Let us consider the question of the scope. The very title of Rorty’s 
“Universality and truth” refers to a connection that is, according 
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to Rorty, rather doubtful, and, according to Habermas, some kind 
of platitude, an “intuition” which is not really in question but simply 
requires clarification. So, instead of taking Rorty’s counterexamples at 
face value, let us try to determine what connection a discourse theory 
may be entitled (or supposed) to establish between the problem of truth 
and that of a universal community of justification. Habermas, as is 
known, refers to defending our truth claims “in all possible contexts, that 
is, at any time and against anybody”. When declaring this, Habermas 
is attempting to express “the intuition […] that true propositions are 
resistant to spatially, socially, and temporally unconstrained attempts 
to refute them” (Habermas, 2000, p. 46). From the point of view of this 
passage, the connection between universality and truth consists in the 
following: a proposition cannot be true if it only resists the attempts to 
refute it made by some people; if it is actually true, it must resist the 
attempts to refute it made by anybody. In other words, it would be odd to 
say something like “I believe p is true, so I expect it to resist the attempts 
to refute it made by subjects S1, S2 and S3, but I do not expect it to resist 
the attempts made by subject S4”. Now, why is this? The obvious reason 
to reject this last analysis of p’s truth is that, when it comes to the truth-
value of p, it should not matter by whom an objection to p is raised in 
dialogue. If p is actually true, it will “resist” attempts of refutation – that 
is to say, more simply, it will not be refuted, period. Claiming that its being 
true means that it will not be refuted by a specific set of individuals, while 
leaving open the possibility of its being refuted by other individuals, is 
as irrational as specifying that it will resist objections in French, but 
conceding that it might not resist objections in German. Now, how does 
this analysis leave us concerning Rorty’s counterexamples?
Whereas a first reading of the debate − according to which the 
existence of three-year-olds becomes a knockdown evidence against a 
discourse theory of truth – risked being unfair to Habermas, we now 
risk − after analyzing the Habermasian articulation between truth 
and universality by means of the notion of “resistance to attempts 
of refutation” – being unfair to Rorty. If Habermas is simply stating 
a platitude such as “a true proposition cannot be refuted by anyone”, 
which follows from the fact that we define “refutation” as “proof of the 
falsity of a proposition”, how can Rorty disagree with that?
Therefore, if we exclude the possibility of Rorty disagreeing with 
a platitude, his objections must be aiming at something which is not 
the trivial tenet concerning the “resistance” of true propositions. If that 
is the case, then precisely the platitudinous character of such a tenet 
prevents it from being relevant to the question at hand.
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This leads us to the second problem that this section needs to 
address. Namely, whether Habermas is presenting something like 
an epistemic deontology, i.e., stating what we, as epistemic agents, 
are obliged to do −as different from reconstructing the conditions of 
a statement’s being true, regardless of any obligation an agent may 
have.1 
This deontology, in fact, seems to be the aim of Rorty’s attacks 
when the latter refers to possible activities to engage in (such as 
defending one’s views to three-year-olds); if this is the case, then what is 
under attack is not a platitude anymore. Quite on the contrary, we will 
have moved from the uncontroversial tenet “a true proposition cannot 
be refuted by anyone” to the more troublesome maxim “if we believe 
that a proposition is true, we should engage in the activity of defending 
it to anyone”. This maxim does not follow from the platitude about 
the “resistance” exerted by true propositions − in fact, the platitude 
in question does not refer to anything anybody should do or refrain 
from doing; it only attempts to elucidate the meaning of “true”, as an 
alternative to an elucidation such as “a true proposition corresponds to 
the states of affairs”, and is as little “deontological” as correspondence 
theory. We must add something to Habermas’ platitude if an epistemic 
obligation is to emerge. And, after adding that extra element, Habermas’ 
point might become less plausible against Rorty’s objections.
The element needs to be something that appropriately connects, 
on the one hand, the conditions for the truth of a proposition and, on the 
other, a series of obligations. How can it be that, if those conditions are 
elucidated in terms of “resistance to objections”, an obligation emerges 
to defend those propositions that we believe are true “against anybody” 
−including such scarcely promissory interlocutors as Nazis, Attila, and 
three-year-olds? 
A possible line of defense of Habermas’ position, understood as a 
deontology, consists in declaring that the contingent, empirical obstacles 
for fulfilling a certain obligation do not cancel such an obligation2. 
1 Kyung Man Kim, for example, takes it for granted that Habermas is literally 
claiming that we have an obligation to defend our beliefs against anyone. This is why 
Kim appeals to the alleged fact that even subjects paradigmatically considered rational, 
as natural scientists, do not fulfill the standards of a Habermasian communicative 
conception of reason, insofar as they “do not think that the ‘tacit knowledge’ they 
use […] has to be justified to people like Habermas who are outside of the scientific 
community. Unlike Habermas, they believe that it is pointless to justify scientific 
rationality to those outside of science” (Kim, 2014, p. 111, cf. also 2011, pp. 398, 402).
2 This is an objection that was raised by an anonymous referee for Análisis 
Filosófico, whom I thank for helping me make the point clearer. 
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According to this line of defense, it is not irrational to claim that in 
principle we should try to defend our beliefs before even the kinds of 
subjects Rorty refers to in his counterexamples; the universalist can 
think that, given enough time, he or she will be able to convince even 
the Nazi and, that, as a consequence, it is not irrational to try to do it. Of 
course, the defense will continue to say, this does not mean that we can 
expect to convince the Nazi in the short term, but of course we can have 
lots of obligations that cannot be fulfilled immediately.
Now, this possible reply to Rorty’s objections assumes (1) that 
we have an epistemic obligation, according to universalism, to try to 
convince anyone of our own beliefs and (2) that (on the basis of the first 
assumption) the only reason why a critic may deny the existence of 
this obligation is that we cannot have a duty to attempt the impossible. 
Consequently, if convincing Nazis of certain moral beliefs is not 
impossible in principle, but only more difficult than convincing other 
kinds of subjects, then the universalistic duty of defending our views to 
literally anyone remains. 
Now, is it reasonable to assume that we have a “pedagogic” 
obligation, such as the one described in (1)? Well, it might be: particularly 
in what concerns moral beliefs, it seems reasonable to assume that if 
“fighting Nazism” is a moral obligation, then “converting Nazis” must be 
an obligation as well−we human beings act in the ways we do because 
of, inter alia, the kinds of beliefs we have, so it would be irrational to say 
that we have a moral obligation to, say, physically fight Nazis but not an 
obligation to discuss their views. However, even if this kind of example 
can support the idea that we have a “pedagogic” obligation in the moral 
realm, it would not be enough to counter Rorty’s criticisms, simply 
because it cannot be applied to theoretical beliefs, such as the case of 
geometry and children. Do we have a duty to teach children everything 
we believe, no matter how abstract? Why would we?
I do not believe, then, that the distinction between obligations “in 
principle” and the empirical circumstances in which those obligations 
are to be fulfilled is a good reply to Rorty. In any case, what really 
matters is that Habermas does not need to vindicate the sort of 
“pedagogic” obligation described in (1). In fact, the whole scenario we 
are describing, in which an agent enters in a communicative exchange 
with another one with the purpose of teaching him or her (that is, an 
asymmetric exchange) is alien to Habermas’ proposal, as Rorty well 
knows. If “universality” and “truth” are connected by discourse theory 
under the form of a deontology, this cannot be because of an obligation 
to “spread the word” but (if there is a deontology at all) because of an 
221
ANÁLISIS FILOSÓFICO 40 Nº 2 (noviembre 2020)
HABERMAS, RORTY, AND THE PROBLEM OF COMPETENT INTERLOCUTORS
obligation to seek the truth. Habermas’ discourse theory does not refer 
at all to “pedagogic” obligations; it simply attempts to elucidate (in early 
formulations) what truth is and (in texts from 1996 onwards) what it 
takes for a belief to be justified. Given that the status of a proposition 
will have to be determined on the basis of how it “fares” in argumentative 
exchanges, we are obliged, as truth-seekers, to expose that proposition 
to as many objections as possible – a kind of demand that is sensitive 
to the specific discursive aspect of Habermas’ proposal; the idea must 
be then that Habermas’ discourse theory of truth entails an epistemic 
deontology which differs from that which would follow from, say, a theory 
according to which the criterion of truth was the result of observations 
carried out by an isolated subject. 
Now, if this obligation (as, recall, “truth-seekers”, not as “spreaders 
of the word”) actually has a strictly universalistic form (i.e., if it entails 
that we need to try to justify our beliefs against literally anyone), it must 
be supported by the prior tenet that the “probative value” of a discursive 
exchange somehow depends on the unrestricted nature of a community 
of justification. In other words, in order to support the deontological 
claim that, as truth-seekers, we are obliged to defend our views against 
anybody, and not only against those we take to be competent interlocutors, 
the claim must also be made that the truth of a proposition p has to be 
defined by reference to the possible agreement of literally everyone – or, 
in a weaker version of the theory, that the establishment of the truth of 
a proposition p has to be defined in this way.
The point is that searching for an epistemic deontology in 
Habermas’ proposal must, in any case, be an indirect task: we need 
to turn now to his discourse theory in order to determine whether a 
reasonable connection with strictly universalistic conditions emerges. 
Before returning to Rorty’s counterexamples, we must, then, take a 
detour through Habermas’ ipsissima uerba.  
2.3. What is Habermas actually doing? Habermas’ theory of truth in the 
early 1970s
In light of the ethnocentric criticisms of Habermas’ universalism, 
it seems relevant to try to shed some light on what his consensus theory 
amounts to. To determine what our obligations as truth-seekers are, in 
the context of Habermas’ proposal, we need to distinguish between the 
following possibilities:
A. Habermas is trying to elucidate in universalistic terms what 
it is for a proposition to be true. That is to say, his universalism claims 
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that there is a connection (in terms of necessary conditions, of sufficient 
conditions, or both) between a proposition being true and the proposition 
being universally agreed upon under certain circumstances.
B. Habermas is trying to elucidate in universalistic terms the 
strictly epistemic fact that a proposition being true has been adequately 
established (which has to be distinguished from the “fact”, not epistemic 
itself, that a proposition is actually true). That is, his universalism 
claims that there is a connection between the universal agreement on a 
proposition and its being adequately established as true. 
Option A is certainly a reading that fits the letter of Habermas’ 
discourse theory of truth as it was presented in the early 1970’s, as 
an explicit alternative to what Habermas calls an “ontological” theory 
of truth–namely, correspondence theory. Whereas the latter would fall 
prey to the circumstance that it is not possible to define truth in terms 
of correspondence with reality, because “reality” is itself a notion that 
can only refer to the correlate of true sentences (that is to say: “reality” 
is conceptually dependent on “true”, and not the other way round) 
(Habermas, 1973/1989, p. 133, cf. 2002, p. 87; Habermas & Luhmann, 
1971/1979, p. 124), a discourse-theory of truth would be free from such 
a disadvantage. A proposition’s being true would thus not be elucidated 
in terms of its correspondence with reality, but in terms of its being 
agreed upon in the context of a rational argumentative exchange (a 
version, mutatis mutandis, of C. S. Peirce’s epistemic notion of truth). In 
Habermas’ own words:
If every other person who could enter into a dialogue with me would 
ascribe the same predicate to the same object, then and only then 
[dann und nur dann] I may ascribe a predicate to an object. In 
order to distinguish true from false statements, I make reference to 
the judgment of others−in fact to the judgments of all others with 
whom I could ever hold a dialogue (among whom I counterfactually 
include all the dialogue partners I could find if my life history were 
coextensive to the history of mankind). The condition of the truth 
of statements is the potential agreement of all others (Habermas, 
1973/1989, pp. 136-137, cf. also 2002, p. 89; Habermas & Luhmann, 
1971/1979, p. 124).
Let us assess how this first option fares against Rorty’s 
counterexamples.
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2.4. Returning to Rorty’s counterexamples
We must inquire whether the definition of truth as it appears 
in these early Habermasian texts provides a basis to the deontological 
claim that, as truth-seekers, we must be interested in defending our 
beliefs against everybody – without any limitations of the community 
of justification in terms of the competence of our interlocutors. In fact, 
what comes immediately to the fore is that the kind of connection 
between truth and universality that might emerge from such texts had 
already been questioned, before Rorty, by Albrecht Wellmer in his 1986 
Ethik und Dialog. 
Although the purpose of Wellmer’s remarks was specifically to 
discuss Habermas’ discourse ethics (as it is developed in Habermas, 
1983/1990), and, as a consequence, he focuses on whether or not 
Habermas’ norms for arguments can be considered as having a “moral 
content” (Wellmer, 1986, p. 105), what matters to our purposes here is 
the step by means of which he discards this possibility. Wellmer believes 
that the reason why these norms are not moral ones is that they cannot 
be understood as norms concerning when to begin or end arguments, 
and this, in turn, follows from the fact that our obligation, as rational 
subjects, not to suppress arguments, not to ignore objections, does not 
entail that we are obliged to take part in argumentative exchanges 
with everyone (Wellmer, 1986, p. 105). In other words, if Habermas is 
proposing a deontology according to which, as truth-seekers, we have 
such an obligation to discuss with everyone, the basis for it is very weak. 
According to Wellmer, it would only be irrational to refuse to enter 
in such exchanges if this were the sign of some kind of defensive reaction, 
as a result of our “fear” of the arguments of others (Wellmer, 1986, p. 106). 
But, of course, such fear need not be the only reason to refuse entering in 
certain argumentative exchanges: as Mattias Iser commented, 
The obligation to engage in a discourse with anybody who demands 
it seems extremely counter-intuitive. Just imagine a person on the 
street who addresses you with the following words: “Dear Sir, the 
colour of your jacket does not fit that of your pants. I propose that 
you take the jacket off” Neither would we feel obliged to follow this 
proposal nor would we be inclined to engage in a discourse with this 
person (Iser, 1998, p. 153).
Iser’s point can be generalized: it is not only that we can discard 
certain specific propositions as not worth discussing; we can also – and 
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this is precisely Rorty’s point – rationally assume that certain subjects 
are unable to offer us any interesting arguments. It is that assumption, 
and not “fear”, which discourages us from discussing trigonometry with 
children or morality with Nazis. Our responsibility as truth-seekers 
seems to be not to protect our beliefs; we must face the risk of our beliefs 
being refuted − but this does not mean that “anybody” is a bearer of 
potential refutations. Rorty’s point is that there is a wide range of people 
that we consider too ignorant or too wrong to raise any interesting points 
about our beliefs. If, as truth-seekers, we had an obligation to discuss 
moral beliefs even with Nazis and trigonometry with three-year-olds, 
this should be the outcome of having reasons to believe that interesting 
objections may come from them. But why should we believe that? In other 
words, the epistemic obligation not to protect our beliefs from possible 
refutations has to be complemented with empirical considerations about 
where those possible refutations might appear. And there is no evidence 
that every human being, simply because of membership in our species, is 
a possible source of objections to each belief we have. Specifying that our 
only obligation is to discuss with competent interlocutors seems, on the 
contrary, a reasonable way to describe our epistemic duties.
It is important to notice that the reason to describe them in 
this way is not that our time is limited, that, for instance, children are 
“low priority” interlocutors. If this were the case, the objection could 
again be raised that temporal limitations are only part of the empirical 
circumstances in which our duties are to be carried out, and this 
empirical point does not affect the obligations we “in principle” have. 
If the question were one about availability of time, then we might 
still be obliged to discuss morality with Nazis and trigonometry with 
children at those occasions in which nothing more pressing requires 
our attention. However, the problem is not at all one of time. Instead, 
it is simply that expecting valuable objections about trigonometry to 
come from three-year-olds, or about moral beliefs from Nazis, may be 
as reasonable as expecting them from animals or inanimate entities. 
In other words, either conditions such as knowledge and intelligence 
are somehow irrelevant – and, in this case, there is no reason to stop 
at the boundaries of our biological species in our quest for potential 
objections − or it is precisely because of fulfilling such conditions that 
human beings count as potential bearers of objections – and in this case, 
of course, a reference to competence is needed3.
3 This kind of considerations is what prevents us from accepting Daniel Kalpokas’s 
defense of Habermas’ position against Rorty’s criticism. Kalpokas takes aim on Rorty’s 
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2.5. The 1996 turn: from a theory of truth to a theory of justification
Now, this “first round” of the debate concerning the relationship 
between Habermas’ universalism and Rorty’s counterexamples refers 
solely to the texts in which the German philosopher attempted to define 
“truth” – that is, to the texts in which Habermas’ purpose is what we 
have identified as option (A) above. However, as is known, the attempted 
definition presented in the texts from the 1970s is rather troublesome, 
which is why Habermas moved to what we have distinguished as option 
(B). Let us analyze this alternative as well.
Whereas objections such as those raised by Rorty concern the 
alleged necessity of certain consensuses for a proposition p’s possibly 
being true (that is, why should it matter whether or not we agree, even in 
“ideal conditions”, with the Nazis?), insofar as Habermas’s texts also refer 
to sufficient conditions, they have been subjected to symmetric objections: 
why should consensus under ideal conditions be considered sufficient for 
truth, why cannot there be a rational consensus about, nevertheless, 
a false proposition? This kind of objection was raised, for example, in 
the context of Habermas’ interview with New Left Review: doesn’t 
the criterion of Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie entail 
tenet that the charge of “performative contradiction” cannot be employed against an 
exclusivist speaker who wants to “offer arguments to the effect that” certain people, 
such as “feminists, atheists, homosexuals, blacks, etc.” cease to be “taken seriously as 
moral equals and conversational partners” (Rorty, 2000, p. 8). Whereas the American 
neo-pragmatist denies that there is any inconsistency at play in such an exclusivist 
stance (because the exclusivist can always justify his position by saying such things 
as “women have a distorted view of reality, and the like” (Rorty, 2000, p. 8)), Kalpokas 
doubts, on the contrary, that “a bigot can argue with those who are to be left outside 
his community, while at the same time denying his communicative intention, his 
attempt to convince by means of arguments, and so on” (Kalpokas, 2005, p. 135). We 
can agree with Kalpokas that such a bigot would indeed be committing a performative 
contradiction, in arguing with, and not only about, people that the bigot is, by means 
of the propositional content of his utterances, declaring  unworthy of participation in 
his community of justification. But this scenario misses the point: what matters here 
is not what the bigot says but who he argues with; the bigot can avoid the performative 
inconsistency that Kalpokas reproaches, simply by not arguing with, say, women, 
Jews, or homosexuals, but simply arguing about them, with interlocutors who are 
themselves male, Aryan, or heterosexuals. Of course, Rorty would agree that this kind 
of exclusionary attitude is repugnant, but he could also insist, once again, that we reject 
this kind of exclusion precisely because we accept women, Jews, and homosexuals as 
potential conversational peers, people from whom we can expect reasonable objections. 
If we do not attribute to some individuals, to begin with, the status of being such peers 
(as we all do regarding children), then we will not need to argue with them, but only 
about them, and of course no performative contradiction will emerge from this.
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the implausible consequence that an ideally rational argumentative 
exchange between ancient Greeks would have reached the truth about, 
say, physics? (Habermas, 1985b, p. 86). Similarly, it is this sufficiency 
condition which is questioned by Wellmer in Ethics and Dialogue: why 
should we believe that a rational consensus between physicists of the 
19th century about Newtonian physics was a proof of its truth–so that, 
consequently, we can only say that Newtonian physics is not true if we 
say that there was never a rational consensus about it? (Wellmer, 1986, 
p. 71). If Habermas’ way out consists, predictably, in insisting on the 
fact that truth amounts to rational consensus under ideal conditions–
which can include the notion that enough time has passed, that is, 
that subjects attaining this consensus find themselves “at the end of 
the inquiry” whereas 19th century physicists did not–then the obvious 
problem emerges that such notion of a final ideal consensus tells us 
nothing useful, in terms of a criterion, about the agreements actually 
arrived at in argumentative exchanges in the real world. Which finally 
leads Habermas to accept precisely the kind of dilemma that Wellmer 
had presented. In Habermas’ words,
Either the normative content of the pragmatic presuppositions of 
rational discourse is insufficient to rule out the fallibility of a consensus 
discursively attained under approximately ideal conditions. Or the 
ideal conditions of rational assertibility that are sufficient for this 
lose the power of regulative ideals to guide behavior because they 
cannot even approximately be met by subjects capable of speech and 
action as we know them (Habermas, 2014, p. 38).
Therefore, Habermas no longer believes that “truth” is an 
epistemic concept, that there is a conceptual connection between truth 
and justified assertibility under ideal conditions such that the latter 
notion can be used to define “truth”. In the “Introduction” to Truth and 
Justification, he writes:
To be sure, for us there is an unavoidable epistemological connection 
between truth and justification […]. But I have […] become convinced 
[…] that this does not amount to a conceptual connection between 
truth and rational assertibility under ideal conditions. […] Even the 
arguments that here and now irresistibly convince us of the truth of 
p can turn out to be false in a different epistemic context. […] These 
objections have prompted me to revise the discursive conception of 
rational acceptability by relating it to a pragmatically conceived, 
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non-epistemic concept of truth, but without thereby assimilating 
“truth” to “ideal assertibility” (Habermas, 2014, pp. 37-38).
Habermas now distinguishes more clearly between, on the one 
hand, the satisfaction of the truth-conditions of a proposition p (which 
satisfaction is not itself an epistemic fact) and, on the other hand, 
what we as epistemic subjects can do to establish whether or not such 
conditions are satisfied. Crucial to this proposal, as follows from the 
passage we have just quoted, is the circumstance that “establishing” the 
truth of p, or rationally “convincing ourselves” of the truth of p does not 
mean that p has been infallibly proven true; therefore, we can describe 
the shift from option A to option B as that from a theory of truth to a 
theory of justification4.
2.6. The persistence of the problem of competence after the 1996 turn 
In any case, what matters to our problem here is that, if not truth, 
at least the (fallible) establishment of truth is elucidated in connection 
with some notion of universal consensus–that is, the universalistic 
aspect of the problem remains. This comes to the fore in “Richard Rorty’s 
pragmatic turn”, an article which initially appeared in 1996 and worth 
quoting in extenso: 
In [the] unavoidable presuppositions of argumentation, the intuition 
is expressed that true propositions are resistant to spatially, socially, 
and temporally unconstrained attempts to refute them. What we hold 
to be true has to be defendable on the basis of good reasons, not merely 
in a different context but in all possible contexts, that is, at any time 
and against anybody. This provides the inspiration for the discourse 
4 In fact, according to Barbara Fultner, what Habermas offered in his texts from 
the 1970s as a “consensus theory of truth” was already “not so much a theory of truth 
as of justification. As an account of truth, it is unsatisfactory because warrants can 
be lost in light of new arguments” (Fultner, 1996, p. 233). She goes on to write that 
“truth cannot simply be defined as warranted assertibility or rational acceptability 
since the warrant or justification may be lost, whereas truth is supposed to be an 
eternal property of a statement” (Fultner, 1996, p. 238). However, there is no real 
disagreement between Fultner’s position in this point and the reconstruction we are 
offering here: she acknowledges that Habermas in the 1970s intended to provide a 
theory of truth, but she criticizes it as insatisfactory and suggests that, as a theory of 
justification, it would fare better. Habermas’ abandonment of an epistemic conception 
of truth can then be described, following Fultner, as his admission of what form his 
theory should, from the beginning, have taken.
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theory of truth: a proposition is true if it withstands all attempts to 
refute it under the demanding conditions of rational discourse. 
However, this does not mean that it is also true for this reason. A 
truth claim raised for ‘p’ says that the truth conditions for ‘p’ are 
satisfied. We have no other way of ascertaining whether or not this 
is the case except by way of argumentation, for direct access to 
uninterpreted truth conditions is denied to us. But the fact that the 
truth conditions are satisfied does not itself become an epistemic 
fact just because we can only establish whether these conditions 
are satisfied by way of discursive vindication of the truth claim 
– whereby we have already had to interpret the truth conditions 
in light of the relevant sorts of reasons for the claim in question 
(Habermas, 1996, pp. 733-734; 2000, p. 46).
As Levine summarizes this move, “while discursive justification 
is the only way to settle contested truth claims and is therefore 
epistemically connected to truth, this does not mean that truth can be 
identified with what is justified, even in ideal conditions” (Levine, 2011, 
p. 246; cf. also Lafont, 2018, p. 301). Therefore, on the one hand, Habermas 
weakens his proposal by making explicit that the epistemic connection 
between truth and justification “must not be turned into a conceptually 
inseparable connection in the form of an epistemic concept of truth” 
(Habermas, 2014, p. 38); on the other hand, discursive vindications of 
a truth claim for p are the only way in which we can establish whether 
or not the truth-conditions of p actually obtain. As a consequence, even 
in this weaker form of the theory, the analysis of rational discourse, 
its conditions and the participants in it remains central in such a way 
that Rorty’s worries remain applicable. The discursive “resistance” of p 
against attempts to refute it no longer means for Habermas that p is 
true, but it does mean that we are justified in claiming that p is true; 
therefore, what kind of consensus, the consensus with whom, should be 
taken to justify us in making such a claim?
Therefore, both in an understanding of Habermas’s proposal 
under option A (as providing a theory of truth) and in an understanding 
of it under option B (as providing a theory of justification) the problem 
emerges of why Habermas does not restrict the community of relevant 
interlocutors to competent ones–which is why Rorty’s worries “cut 
through” the difference between these two versions of the theory. 
Now, as we anticipated, in 1971 Habermas did include a 
competence condition in his discourse theory of truth. Let us now 
consider the texts from that year and the difficulties they raise.
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3. The status of “competence in judgment” in Habermas’s 1971 
Gauss Lectures: the competence condition and the problem of 
circularity
Habermas’ point in the early 70s was to admit that we can indeed 
define truth by reference to consensus obtained by competent subjects. 
However, Habermas (unlike Rorty) also pointed out that in doing so 
we face a serious problem. Namely, that (in the opposite direction of 
the definitional work) the very status of “competent” can be reasonably 
attributed to a subject only on the basis of a rational discourse on the 
question (Habermas, 2002, p. 96; the passage corresponds to Habermas 
& Luhmann, 1971/1979, pp. 134-135). In the context of a dialogue with 
a critic who demands that a competence condition be included in the 
theory (as did Rorty, Wellmer and McCarthy), Habermas’ declaration 
that competence can only be rightly attributed as the outcome of a 
discourse places the German philosopher in a curious situation: on the 
one hand, his theory has to face a circle between “rational agreement” 
and “competent subject” when it comes to the concrete application of 
these concepts to particular cases. On the other hand, according to this 
early version of Habermas’ theory, facing this circle is something that an 
author such as Rorty should do; any other attribution of “competence” 
seems unjustified to Habermas. 
Let us reconstruct how this problem appears in Habermas’ 1971 
Gauss Lectures (the text of which, in turn, overlaps in a series of relevant 
aspects with the formulations in Theorie der Gesselschaft). Given that 
these passages have been surprisingly overlooked in the analysis of the 
Habermas-Rorty debate, we will need to cite some of them in extenso.
 
3.1. Competence and circularity
In the last of his Gauss conferences, Habermas presents an 
attempted definition of truth in the sense that we saw in section 2.2, 
above. However, some pages after having introduced this alleged 
conceptual connection between truth and the assent of every other 
speaker, Habermas adds the following clarification: 
According to the consensus theory of truth, the condition for redeeming 
the truth of propositions is the potential assent of all other persons. 
Now, as a matter of fact, there are always only a few persons against 
whose assent I can check my assertion’s claim to validity. The actual 
assent that I can possibly obtain from a few others is more likely to 
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be endorsed by further judges, the less we and others see any reason 
to doubt their competence to judge. Therefore we shall restrict the 
truth condition that has been introduced counterfactually as follows: 
I may assert p if every other competent judge would agree with me 
in this assertion (Habermas, 2002, p. 95; Habermas & Luhmann, 
1971/1979, pp. 124-125).  
This last sentence is one that Rorty could have gladly agreed to–in 
fact, it is hardly distinguishable from what Rorty, as we saw, describes as 
the “ideal presupposed by discourse”. The divergence, however, appears 
immediately later, when Habermas asks the question “But what can 
competence in judgment mean in this context?” (cf. Brand, 1976, p. 
287 for an early problematization on this point; Habermas, 2002, p. 95; 
Habermas & Luhmann, 1971/1979, p. 125). Habermas refers here to 
Kamlah and Lorenzen, who claimed “that competent judges must be 
capable of performing appropriate verification procedures, […] must 
have expert knowledge” (Habermas, 2002, p. 95; Habermas & Luhmann, 
1971/1979, p. 125). Nevertheless, the problem for Habermas is how to 
determine “what sort of verification procedure is to count as appropriate 
in a given case”, and “who may claim to be an expert”. “These questions, 
too”, the German philosopher goes on to say, 
must be subject to discourse, the outcome of which in turn depends 
on a consensus among the participants. Expertise is no doubt a 
condition that must be satisfied by a competent judge. But we cannot 
specify any independent criteria for what counts as “expertise”; 
deciding on the choice of these criteria itself depends on the outcome 
of the discourse (Habermas, 2002, p. 95; Habermas & Luhmann, 
1971/1979, p. 125).
The problem of circularity, according to Habermas, emerges not 
only for the assessment of claims to truth, but also for other validity 
claims: 
The consensus theory of truth makes us aware that it is not 
possible to decide on the truth of propositions without reference to 
the competence of possible judges. […] The idea of true consensus 
requires that the participants in discourse be able to distinguish 
reliably between reality and appearance, essence and accident, and 
is and ought; for only then can they be competent to judge the truth of 
propositions, the veracity of utterances, and the legitimacy of actions. 
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Yet in none of these three dimensions can we specify a criterion that 
would allow for an independent assessment of the competence of 
possible judges or participants in deliberation. Rather, it seems as 
though the competence to judge itself must be judged on the basis of 
the same kind of consensus for whose evaluation criteria are to be 
found (Habermas, 2002, p. 96; Habermas & Luhmann, 1971/1979, pp. 
134-135. Emphasis ours).
So, summing up, we seem to need to appeal to the subjects’ 
“competence in judgment” in order to be able to trust that some “actual 
assent”, a consensus achieved in some particular discursive exchange, is 
rational and thus actually probative of anything at all, but it is also only 
as a result of rational assent that we can ever say, in a justified manner, 
that certain subjects are actually competent.5
3.2. Why the circularity problem does not emerge for Rorty
Of course, the circle would not emerge if we could show that (a) 
the cognitive competence of certain subjects does not depend on such a 
competence having been proven by means of discursive consensus. Or, 
alternatively, if we held that (b) we can take some discursive consensuses 
to justify us in claiming truth for certain propositions without it being 
necessary to problematize, at the same time, the competence of the 
subjects involved in such consensuses (for example, by taking some 
discursive consensuses as probative on the basis of their procedural 
properties).
We can illustrate this opposition by returning to Rorty’s 
example of a surgeon facing a Chinese traditional doctor. To make a 
clearer comparison, let us speak about a group of doctors. According to 
Habermas’ proposal, it would be troublesome to say that practitioners of 
Western medicine are “competent” subjects for the assessment of a series 
5 We might also speak here of a risk of infinite regress, and not only one of circularity. 
According to Fultner, “Treating rational consensus as a criterion or condition for 
truth presents the threat of an infinite regress if not of circularity. For it seems that 
whether a consensus is indeed rational, whether it guarantees truth, in turn depends 
on yet another consensus” (Fultner, 1996, p. 240). However, Fultner is considering 
only the relationship between a first-order question, such as “Is p true?”, and a 
second-order question, such as “Was the consensus about the truth of p a rational 
one?” (which would also need to be answered discursively) without referring to the 
key problem of what subjects should take part in each argumentative exchange. In 
other words, Fultner is correct to point a problem out, but the situation for Habermas’ 
theory is even worse.
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of propositions referred to human health, whereas Chinese traditional 
doctors are not: in fact, the “competence to judge” that those doctors 
have must itself “be judged on the basis of consensus” and, in turn, we 
will obtain different consensuses depending on how the community that 
judges about the competence of these doctors is composed.
Now, it seems rather clear that Rorty leans towards solution 
(a). Though he does not explicitly address the circle Habermas finds 
between competence and consensus, he does, nonetheless, take certain 
beliefs as determining “where we are”, as a starting point that provides 
us with normative standards for the consideration of other beliefs and, 
indirectly, for the consideration of the competence of other subjects–
which would authorize us, in turn, to call the practitioners of Western 
science, and not Chinese traditional doctors, “competent”. In Rorty’s 
words, we “should accept the fact that we have to start from where we 
are, and that this means that there are lots of views which we simply 
cannot take seriously” (Rorty, 1984b, p. 11).
Insofar as, according to Rorty, “human beings are centerless 
networks of beliefs and desires and […] their vocabularies and opinions 
are determined by historical circumstance”, the possibility may appear 
that there is not “enough overlap between two such networks”. When 
that happens, Rorty continues, “we” do not question “our” beliefs; 
instead, we can call our interlocutors “crazy”, because our attempts to 
converse “have made us realize that we are not going to get anywhere” 
(Rorty, 1991b, p. 191). And this is because–as Rorty wrote in the context 
of rejecting the notion of “transcultural validity”–“The interesting 
question is not whether a claim can be ‘rationally defended’ but 
whether it can be made to cohere with a sufficient number of our beliefs 
and desires” (Rorty, 1990, p. 640, cf. also 1991a, p. 50 for an explicit 
connection between the notion of ethnocentrism and the criterial value 
attributed to “ our own present beliefs”). This amounts to saying that, 
in the framework of Rorty’s ethnocentrism, unlike that of Habermas’ 
proposal, the attribution (or, more clearly, the refusal) of the condition 
of “competent subject” takes place independently of the result of any 
previous argumentative consensus about competence. According to 
Rorty, “we” divide subjects as competent or incompetent as the result of 
the existence or not of a sufficient overlap with the beliefs “we” already 
have–and these beliefs are not, at the moment, problematized.
Now, the question whether or not this “Rortyan” solution is 
acceptable (that is to say, whether or not we can speak of competent 
subjects without needing to appeal to a discursive exchange in the context 
of which such a competence would have been proven) depends on how 
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reasonable Habermas’ own way out of the circle turns out to be. As we 
will try to show in the next section, Habermas himself seems to move to 
solution (b)–that is, he wishes to describe some discursive exchanges as 
probative of truth by virtue only of their procedural properties, without 
worrying about the competence of the subjects involved in them– but 
this solution is far from unobjectionable.
4. The appeal to the notion of “ideal speech situation”
4.1. “Expert verification” and “ideal speech situation” in Habermas’ texts 
from 1971 
Let us then return to Habermas’ ipsissima uerba in his texts 
from the early 70s. We arrived at a seemingly unsurpassable circle. It 
is of no help, adds Habermas, to think that the circle “could be broken 
[…] by an ontological theory of truth”, as the correspondence theory, 
because “none of these copy or correspondence theories has […] held 
up under scrutiny”. However, he goes on to say, we cannot simply stop 
at a pessimistic finding that the circle is irresolvable: “Were this the 
case […], it would be hard to understand why we nonetheless assume in 
every conversation that we can reach a mutual understanding. In fact 
we are always confident that we know how to tell a rational consensus 
from an illusory one” (Habermas, 2002, p. 96; Habermas & Luhmann, 
1971/1979, p. 135).
By stating this, Habermas has not yet introduced what his own 
solution will consist of, but this turn of the analysis is already interesting. 
Habermas’ proposal here is (at least partly) descriptive, and not (purely) 
normative, in the sense that it does not attempt to assess whether or 
not we are justified, after all, in assuming that we can distinguish 
“a rational consensus from an illusory one”–an attempt that might 
consequently reach the skeptical result that we are not in fact justified. 
On the contrary, Habermas is considering here a factum, the factum 
that we always make that assumption, and wants to explain it, not to 
seek for its epistemological foundations. If we lacked the confidence 
that we can distinguish a true consensus, Habermas continues, “we 
could not tacitly presuppose the sense of speech that is always already 
accepted at the metacommunicative level and without which ordinary 
language communication would be meaningless–namely, its rational 
character. This phenomenon requires explanation” (Habermas, 2002, 
p. 96. Emphasis ours. Cf. the similar lines in Habermas & Luhmann, 
1971/1979, pp. 135-136).
234
ANÁLISIS FILOSÓFICO 40 Nº 2 (noviembre 2020)
CLAUDIO JAVIER CORMICK
So, predictably, Habermas is no skeptic, and he wishes only to 
explain our communicative practices, not to doubt their rationality. What 
is at stake is, consequently, whether Habermas’ solution constitutes 
a better explanation of such practices than Rorty’s own proposal. 
Now, what Habermas introduces at this point is the well-known, and 
very polemical, notion of “ideal speech situation”. Immediately after 
presenting a demand for explanation of the “phenomenon” of always 
counting with our own ability to distinguish rational agreements, he 
writes:
I would argue that what explains it is that the participants in 
argumentation mutually presuppose something like an ideal speech 
situation. The defining feature of the ideal speech situation is that 
any consensus attainable under its conditions can count per se as a 
rational consensus. My thesis is that only the anticipation of an ideal 
speech situation warrants attaching to any consensus that is in fact 
attained the claim that it is a rational consensus (Habermas, 2002, p. 
97; cf. Habermas & Luhmann, 1971/1979, p. 136).
So we see that, according to Habermas, insofar as we want to 
conceive our communicative practices as rational, we need to assume 
that we can in fact distinguish instances of truly rational consensus, 
even if that assumption has to be a presupposition. Now, what is more 
important for our purposes here is to highlight the fact that, by means 
of the appeal to the presupposition of an ideal speech situation, two 
different problems might be solved, but the way in which Habermas 
develops the notion of such a situation (by referring only to the procedural 
aspect of the argumentative exchange) can satisfactorily tackle only 
one of them. One of those problems is whether or not certain factually 
obtained consensus about a proposition p has been in fact a rational 
one–in opposition to agreements which stem from coercion or some kind 
of asymmetry between participants, detrimental for the free play of 
arguments. Another problem, the really interesting one, is whether or 
not a certain consensus about p is in fact a sufficient justification for 
claiming that p is true. 
The first problem might well be tackled by analyzing only the 
formal properties of the argumentative exchange, irrespective of any 
considerations on the cognitive competence of the participants in the 
dialogue, but it cannot be all what Habermas is concerned about here. 
“The idea of true consensus”, as we have seen in the texts from 1971, 
“requires that the participants in discourse be able to distinguish reliably 
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between reality and appearance […] for only then can they be competent 
to judge the truth of propositions” (Habermas, 2002, p. 96; Habermas & 
Luhmann, 1971/1979, pp. 134-135). In other words, participants in a 
rational discourse who are not able to “distinguish between reality and 
appearance” would not be able to judge the truth of propositions even 
if, from a procedural point of view, their communicative exchange were 
flawless. Therefore, if we want to know whether an argumentatively 
agreement about p justifies us in claiming truth for p, it is not enough to 
make presuppositions only about the procedure that has been followed; 
it would also be necessary to make presuppositions about, as McCarthy 
wrote, “empirical conditions”, such as those “referring to the intelligence, 
competence, psychological normality, etc. of the participants” (T. A. 
McCarthy, 1973, p. 150).
Now, in Habermas’ words, a speech situation is “ideal if 
communication is impeded neither by external contingent forces nor […] 
by constraints arising from the structure of communication itself. The 
ideal speech situation excludes systematic distortion of communication. 
Only then is the sole prevailing force the characteristic unforced force of 
the better argument, which allows assertions to be methodically verified 
in an expert manner” (Habermas, 2002, pp. 97-98. Emphasis ours). 
But what follows from this is that if a speech situation is “ideal”, and 
consequently participants in it guide themselves by the “unforced force 
of the better argument”, communication will not be “impeded”; in other 
words, if participants in it are capable of “methodical verification in an 
expert manner”, as Habermas writes, then their capability for such a 
verification will find no obstacles in communication. But it is one thing 
to say that, in absence of structural obstacles, this ability for expert 
verification will find its way, and it is quite another to say that purely 
structural conditions can work a creatio ex nihilo of good arguments. For 
the capacity of expert verification to function “unimpeded”, it needs to be 
present in the speech situation in the first place–and this demand is not 
included among the conditions of an ideal speech situation. Habermas 
only describes the condition that “all participants in dialogue” must 
have (1) “the same opportunity to […] initiate communication and to 
continue it through speaking and responding or asking questions and 
giving answers”; (2) the same opportunities “to put forth interpretations, 
assertions, explanations, and justifications and to establish or refute 
their claims to validity” (Habermas, 2002, p. 98); they must also have, 
as actors (that is, when they are not participants in discourse) (3) the 
same opportunities to use “representative” speech acts, so that they “can 
translate their non-verbal expressions into linguistic utterances” and 
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(4) equally symmetric opportunities “to command and resist, to allow 
and forbid […], to answer for one’s actions and demand others to do so”, 
which “ensures the possibility of withdrawing at any time from contexts 
of interaction and entering into discourses that thematize claims to 
validity” (Habermas, 2002, p. 99).    
Now, it is quite ironic that, whereas Habermas was well aware 
of the risk of circularity raised by the notion of “competent subject”, 
as we saw in section 4, when he introduces the presupposition of an 
ideal speech situation as a solution for this circularity he seems to 
have completely forgotten the problem of competence. If it is legitimate 
to presuppose that an argumentative exchange is taking place under 
ideal conditions in the sense that the structure of communication is 
symmetrical and lets the exchange be guided by “the force of the better 
argument”, it is not clear why it would not be exactly as legitimate for 
speakers to presuppose (without prior proof, hence without generating 
any vicious circle) that their interlocutors in the exchange in question 
are competent. 
4.2. The problem in “Wahrheitstheorien”
But the disappearance of the problem of competence from 
Habermas’s sight gets even worse: in “Wahrheitstheorien” (written in 
1972 and first published the following year), several elements appear 
which are surprisingly similar to those in the texts from 1971–all the 
more surprisingly insofar as, in this later text, they are introduced 
without any reference to the problem of competence which was central 
in the previous works. 
In effect, in “Wahrheitstheorien” Habermas (a) insists again on 
the factum that we always assume that we can distinguish between 
a rational consensus and an illusory one; (b) declares, yet again, that 
without such an assumption we would have to give up the claim for 
a “rational character” of communication (Habermas, 1973/1989, p. 
180; the passages are parallel to those in 2002, p. 96; Habermas & 
Luhmann, 1971/1979, p. 135); (c) that, as a consequence of this, we need 
to consider the ideal speech situation as an inevitable presupposition 
made by participants in argumentation  (Habermas, 1973/1989, p. 180; 
compare with 2002, p. 97; Habermas & Luhmann, 1971/1979, p. 136), 
and (d) that the ideal speech situation is neither a regulative principle 
in the Kantian sense nor an “existing concept” in the Hegelian sense 
(Habermas, 1973/1989, p. 181; see 2002, pp. 102-103; Habermas & 
Luhmann, 1971/1979, pp. 140-141). But now the context in which all 
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these elements are introduced is not that of the concern about whether 
“the participants in discourse can be competent to judge the truth of 
propositions”, but only the remark that “an argumentatively obtained 
consensus is a sufficient criterion for the redemption [Einlösung] of 
discursive validity claims if and only if, by means of the formal properties 
of discourse, the freedom of movement between the different levels of 
discourse is guaranteed” (Habermas, 1973/1989, pp. 176-177).
This notion of “levels of discourse” must be understood in the 
context of Habermas’ tenet that, for the “structure of argumentation” 
to produce “rationally motivated decisions about […] validity claims”, 
discourse has to allow a possible “revision” of the entire “language 
system” in which such claims were initially formulated (Habermas, 
1973/1989, p. 174). In Pettit’s words, the argumentative practice “must 
even tolerate interrogation of the very conceptual scheme within which 
the original claim was put forward” (Pettit, 1982, p. 214). The “freedom 
of movement” between such levels of discourse, according to Habermas, 
is guaranteed by, specifically, the “formal properties” of “an ideal speech 
situation” (Habermas, 1973/1989, p. 177),  and at this point he introduces 
a fourfold enumeration of  conditions of such a situation that is roughly 
the same which we have seen in previous texts (cf. Habermas, 1973/1989, 
pp. 177-178). But, again, and just as we pointed out in connection with 
the texts from 1971, it is one problem whether a consensus about p has 
been rationally obtained, and another problem whether the existence 
of that consensus somehow justifies us in claiming truth for p. It is 
this second problem that Habermas should be able to solve, insofar 
as he explicitly and repeatedly declares to be in search of the kind of 
consensus that would be “a sufficient criterion for the redemption of 
discursive validity claims” (Habermas, 1973/1989, p. 177. Emphasis 
ours.); that in fact a consensus obtained under the conditions of an 
ideal speech situation can be considered “a criterion for the redemption 
of each thematized validity claim” (Habermas, 1973/1989, p. 179); or 
even more strongly, that “a rational consensus” is “truth-guaranteeing” 
(he speaks of distinguishing a “wahrheitsverbürgenden Konsensus” 
from a deceiving one) (Habermas, 1973/1989, p. 180). Therefore, the 
same objection applies as before: even if we grant Habermas that an 
argumentative exchange is only rational if it guarantees “freedom 
of movement” between “levels of discourse”, this freedom, in absence 
of a sufficient cognitive competence by participants in discourse will 
not guarantee an adequate assessment of propositions. Even if no 
structural constraint prevents participants from thematizing, not only 
the validity claimed for a specific proposition p, but also the broader 
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“language-system” in which p was raised, it might well be the case that 
such participants are simply unable to make reasonable criticisms at 
any “level of discourse”. Therefore, the result that “no prejudice remains 
free from thematization and critique” (Habermas, 1973/1989, p. 177) 
might not be achieved anyway, and not because of structural constraints 
to the freedom of participants in discourse, but because of the cognitive 
limitations of these participants. Which is why, summing up, Habermas’ 
appeal to the notion of an ideal speech situation is insufficient.
5. A remaining obstacle: the problem of disagreement and non-
neutrality
5.1. A curious exchange of positions: Rorty and Wellmer, 2010 
So far, our analysis about whether or not to include a competence 
condition when reconstructing what kind of consensus has a justifying 
value with respect to a truth claim has assumed that it is Rorty who 
defends the inclusion of such a condition, whereas Habermas, though 
having considered it in texts from 1971, later came to relinquish 
it. However, even if our proposed description of the debate is, in 
acknowledging the role of these early Habermasian texts, more nuanced 
than the one presented by Rorty himself, we have so far omitted any 
reference to the circumstance that, in the exchange between Rorty and 
Wellmer in the volume devoted to the former in the “Library of Living 
Philosophers” series, Rorty casts some doubt on the usefulness of a 
reference to competence. Let us briefly dwell on this exchange.
In an early criticism of Habermas’ discourse theory of truth, 
Wellmer had declared that such a theory is false if it does not 
specify “that true validity-claims are precisely those upon which an 
uncoerced consensus can be achieved among those who are sufficiently 
capable of judgement” [Urteilsfähigen], but that, at the same time, if 
Habermas’ theory included a reference to such “capacity for judgement” 
[Urteilsfähigkeit], then it “would be void of any substantial content” (cf. 
also Ferrara, 1987, p. 49, 1989, p. 308; Wellmer, 1986, p. 72. Emphasis 
ours). However, Wellmer changed his mind on the subject, because, in 
his contribution to The Philosophy of Richard Rorty he made use of the 
notion of competence precisely in order to defend the tenet that we can 
consider some reasons to be “good” in spite of the fact that they do not 
convince everyone. Taking aim at Rorty’s alleged counterexample of a 
man fruitlessly attempting to convince the prison guards to let him 
escape to resume his role as leader of the resistance, which, according 
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to Rorty, proves that there would be no point in the man later saying, 
“Still, they were good arguments” (Rorty, 2000, p. 9), Wellmer responds 
that “obviously it would be wrong to conclude that the prisoner did not 
have good reasons for trying to escape; his prison guards are just the 
wrong (an incompetent) audience to be persuaded by his arguments. 
The prisoner certainly has a better audience in mind” (Wellmer, 2010, p. 
317. Emphasis ours). Indeed, Wellmer continues, when our arguments 
turn out not to convince our interlocutors, it may well be the case that 
“Our position may turn out to be weak”, but the case can also be that 
“the audience may be in the grip of strong prejudices or may just be 
the wrong (an ‘incompetent’) audience” (Wellmer, 2010, p. 318), and so 
on. “Making a sincere assertion or justifying a belief” is, in the end, 
“connected with the understanding that the assertion or belief should be 
acceptable to any sufficiently competent or enlightened person” (Wellmer, 
2010, p. 327. Emphasis ours).
As we see, what is required for us to consider that a belief, or a 
reason for a belief, is acceptable is not consensus tout court, but consensus 
among “competent or enlightened subjects”.   Insofar as the cognitive 
competence of our fellow speakers can be questioned, we can still explain 
their lack of assent to our own beliefs in a way that does not make us doubt 
about the latter. As we anticipated, it is Rorty who now criticizes the last 
passage we have quoted: “given the absence of criteria for sufficiency of 
competence or enlightenment, to make [that] assertion seems just a way 
of insulting people who disagree with me” (Rorty, 2010, p. 345).
This reply seems odd. What exactly can Rorty mean when he 
allegedly verifies the “absence of criteria for sufficiency of competence 
or enlightenment”? Surely enough, Rorty does have in mind something 
similar to such “criteria” when he decides that there exist, as we saw, 
“people whose […] inability to agree with us raises no doubt in our 
minds about the correctness of our own beliefs”. Mutatis mutandis, these 
people seem to be, from the point of view of Rorty’s ethnocentrism, in the 
same position as those who, according to Wellmer, are not “sufficiently 
competent or enlightened”–that is, people whose lack of assent with our 
reasons would not make us believe that perhaps we are not mobilizing 
“good reasons” after all. Here again, it is not clear why Rorty’s rejoinder 
to Wellmer could be legitimate without, at the same time, jeopardizing 
central aspects of Rorty’s own ethnocentrism. There is, nonetheless, a 
sense in which his remark on the “absence of criteria” becomes useful to 
illuminate a last aspect of the Rorty/Habermas debate.
Namely, what Rorty can, in fact, claim is that there is an absence 
of neutral criteria “for sufficiency of competence or enlightenment”–in 
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other words, there may well exist such criteria, but they are subject to 
disagreement, to deep cultural differences between communities, as can 
be illustrated by the passage about Western and Chinese traditional 
doctors. Rorty could in fact accept a principle such as “we are justified 
in claiming truth for a proposition p if p has been rationally agreed 
upon by competent subjects”, but he would immediately complete this 
elucidation by adding that who we consider competent will not be a 
neutral affair; it will depend on some other epistemic commitments. Let 
us see what the repercussions of this last element are for the debate 
with Habermas. 
5.2. The problem of non-neutrality as a possible argument against the 
preservation of the competence condition
With this last aspect, the problem emerges that the character 
of “subject competent in judgment” will not be attributed to the same 
individuals by (to take up Rorty’s examples) Christian Scientists, 
traditional Chinese physicians, and secular Western scientists. 
There seems to be an inescapable disagreement as to who deserves 
to be considered “competent”. Members of a community of Western 
secular scientists can call themselves “competent” and exclude those 
of a community of Christian scientists, and vice versa. Therefore, a 
consequence of including the competence condition in an elucidation 
of what it is to have justified a proposition is that our analysis of 
justification will take a form as “we are justified in claiming truth for 
p if and only if there has been a rational consensus about p by what 
our community takes to be competent speakers”. This is predictably a 
consequence that Rorty would wholeheartedly accept: in a number of 
passages, Rorty insists that there is no such a thing as being justified, 
period, but only being justified for “us” (Rorty, 1993, pp. 449-452, cf., for 
example, 2000, p. 15). Habermas’ universalism, on the contrary, seems 
prima facie entirely at odds with the possibility of accepting a notion 
of “subject competent to judge” whose attribution depends on previous 
commitments with beliefs which are distinctive of “our” community. 
Under this interpretation, it should come as no surprise that Habermas 
has relinquished a “competence condition” and turned, instead, to the 
procedural characteristics of a speech situation in order to elucidate 
what it means to be justified in claiming truth for a proposition. In other 
words, the inescapable problem of non-neutrality in the attribution of 
competence would create a dilemma for Habermas, who would have 
either to drop the problem of “competence in judgment” or, by accepting 
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that there is no such thing as a neutral attribution of competence, to 
adopt “ethnocentrism” in the Rortyan sense.
Now, if these two were the only options available, then it is clear 
that Habermas could not make room for a competence condition without 
assimilating his own position to Rorty’s. However, it should also be clear 
that the overall difference between Rorty’s epistemology and Habermas’ 
cannot depend on acknowledging or not that any decision between 
beliefs belonging to different belief-systems (such as the beliefs of a 
Western scientist and those of a Chinese traditional doctor, a decision 
which in turn determines who we will call “competent”) will be based 
on standards which are not “neutral” between those different belief-
systems. In fact, Habermas gladly accepts, when analyzing the operation 
of “understanding” carried by a social scientist in contact with a radically 
different culture, that he or she will need to appeal to her own standards 
against those of the community he or she is trying to understand, if the 
two sets of standards happen to be incompatible. Far from refusing to 
embrace non-neutrality, Habermas writes that even to understand an 
expression, “the interpreter must bring to mind the reasons with which 
a speaker would if necessary and under suitable conditions defend 
its validity”; that, in turn, describing these reasons “demands eo ipso 
an evaluation” (Habermas, 1985a, pp. 115-116) of such reasons and, 
finally, that this evaluation is something that the scientist can only do 
by appealing to his or her own standards: “An interpreter cannot […] 
take a position without applying his own standards of judgment, at any 
rate standards that he has made his own. These relate critically to other, 
divergent standards of judgment” (Habermas, 1985a, p. 116. Emphasis 
ours). Therefore, if, according to Habermas, the social scientist will not 
only be allowed but compelled to make such claims as “S’s affirmation 
that p is not well founded on reasons, and my standards for declaring 
this are my own, and not S’s”, there is no reason why he could not accept 
similar claims such as “S is not a competent subject, and my standards 
for declaring this are those of my community”. If non-neutrality is not 
viewed by Habermas as a fatal obstacle for his theory of understanding 
–a theory which he has, in fact, defended against his critics by insisting 
that understanding simply cannot be neutral (cf. McCarthy’s criticisms 
in T. A. McCarthy, 1984, and Habermas’s reply in Habermas, 1984, pp. 
238–239)–then it would be odd and ad hoc to insist on such a need for 
neutrality when it comes to assessing “competence in judgment”.
The move that would turn Habermas’ position into Rorty’s is not, 
in fact, the bare recognition that a lot of assessments must be made 
non-neutrally. What is really distinctive of ethnocentrism is not the 
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acknowledgment that “we” may need to appeal to “our” standards, but 
a further tenet, according to which those standards are not themselves 
justifiable; in other words, that whereas there can be a justification 
of propositions on the basis of certain epistemic standards, there can 
be no meta-justification of the standards themselves (cf. for example 
Rorty, 1986, p. 526, for a denial of the tenet that ‘our’ culture is ‘more 
closely linked to the nature of humanity or the demands of rationality’ 
than other cultures are). What Habermas reproaches to Rorty is not the 
admission that “our” standards differ from those of other cultures, but 
the tenet that “standards of rationality are simply not to be distinguished 
in type from any other standards used in our culture” (Habermas, 1992, 
p. 136)–that is, not to be distinguished from mere conventions. Now, our 
point here is not to assess whether Habermas’ trust in the possibility 
of such meta-justification of standards, which distances him from 
ethnocentrism, is in fact well founded. That inquiry is beyond the scope 
of this article.6 Our point is, more modestly, to show that the absence of 
neutral “criteria for sufficiency of competence or enlightenment”, and 
the subsequent need to appeal to those of “our” community, does not 
necessarily amount to a new, specific difficulty for Habermas’s theory; it 
is, so to say, a problem the theory already has, for independent reasons.
6. Conclusions
Let us recapitulate. As we saw in section 2, criticisms of 
Habermas’ universalism such as those suggested by Rorty are unfair 
if they attribute the German philosopher some sort of naïve epistemic 
deontology according to which we have a “pedagogic” obligation to 
6 Rorty, for example, offers an alternative reading of what Habermas describes 
as the development of “elements of reason” in Western culture (Rorty, 1984a, p. 35) − 
that is to say, a reading in which standards of current Western culture do not appear 
as susceptible of a meta-justification that shows their objective superiority, in terms 
of rationality, vis-à-vis previous standards. An adequate assessment of the problem of 
meta-justification would take us beyond the frame of the Rorty-Habermas debate and 
would require us to review, inter alia, Paul Boghossian’s reading of what he takes to be 
Rorty’s relativism (Boghossian, 2007, pp. 59-94), allegedly centered on the tenet that 
“different communities may operate with different epistemic systems and that there 
can be no facts by virtue of which one of these systems is any more correct than any of 
the others” (Boghossian, 2007, p. 93), Markus Seidel’s uptake of Boghossian’s insights 
in the frame of what he describes as the “problem of norm-circularity” (Seidel, 2014, 
pp. 137-191), Martin Kusch’s reply to Boghossian’s and Seidel’s criticisms of Rorty 
(Kusch, 2017a) and, more generally, Kusch’s defense of “no-metajustification” (Kusch, 
2017b). This is a task to which we will hopefully return to in a subsequent paper.
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defend our views to literally anyone. The kind of epistemic deontology 
that can be extracted from Habermas’ discourse theory is, however, 
that as truth-seekers we are obliged to discuss with everybody (and 
not only with competent interlocutors), which is by itself troublesome. 
Habermas’ actual purposes (to elucidate the notion of truth, first, and 
that of justification, later) appeal to a notion of consensus that should 
remain connected, as we argued, with that of competent subjects. Given 
that, as we saw in section 3, Habermas himself did appeal, in early 
texts, to a notion of “competence in judgment”, we needed to dwell on 
the question whether he had good reasons to relinquish the competence 
condition in later works. As we tried to prove in section 4, whereas 
Habermas himself, in the context of his Gauss Lectures, identified a 
difficulty in the appeal to the concept of competent subjects–that is, the 
possible circle between determining that an agreement has probative 
value and determining that participants in it are competent–, his own 
proposed solution to the circle, which consists of the presupposition 
of an ideal speech situation, does not justify giving more weight to 
“formal” or “procedural” aspects of this ideal situation (as is symmetry 
between participants) above the condition of subjective cognitive 
competence: symmetrical chances of mobilizing arguments cannot, 
by themselves, guarantee that the consensus be guided by “expert 
verification” if this capacity is not already present in the participants in 
the dialogue. Finally, we highlighted in section 5 (by means of a detour 
through Rorty’s brief criticism of Wellmer’s appeal to the condition of 
“competence or enlightenment”), that the inclusion of a competence 
condition raises doubts concerning non-neutrality in the assessment 
of such competence. Nevertheless, as we tried to argue, this should 
not raise a special difficulty for a theory, as is Habermas’, according to 
which social scientists are obliged to appeal to their own standards of 
rationality against, if necessary, those of other communities.
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